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I. Introduction 
Each year, the U.S. government decides whether to transfer 
individuals from the United States to foreign countries in 
connection with deportation proceedings, detainee releases, and 
extradition requests.1 Individuals facing transfer may bring a 
statutory claim against the U.S. government in federal court to 
bar their transfer on the grounds that it is more likely than not 
that they will be tortured in the recipient country. To challenge 
their pending involuntary transfer,2 they rely on U.S. treaty 
obligations under the 1984 United Nations Convention Against 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Steve Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter: A Primer on 
FARRA, REAL ID, and the Role of the Courts in Transfer/Extradition Cases, 
LAWFARE (June 12, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/why-
the-munaf-sequels-matter/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing forms of 
transfer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (detailing Garcia’s challenge to his extradition to the Philippines 
alleging it would violate his statutory rights); Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 
F.3d 13, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining Omar’s claim that a statute grants 
him a right to judicial review of the conditions in the receiving country—Iraq—
prior to his transfer from U.S. military custody to Iraqi authority); Mironescu v. 
Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing Mironescu’s petition for 
habeas corpus—claiming that his extradition to Romania would violate his 
statutory rights). 
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Torture (CAT),3 incorporated into U.S. law by the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA).4 CAT and 
FARRA proscribe the transfer of a person if “there are substantial 
grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture upon return.”5 
Ideally, fact-specific decisions in these cases depend on the 
context in which a person raises a FARRA claim: either in 
connection with post-9/11 detention at Guantanamo Bay, normal 
extradition of individuals wanted by another country for criminal 
prosecution, or to serve a postconviction sentence.6 With respect 
to the first category, Guantanamo detainees require a recipient 
country in which to resettle7 after successfully challenging their 
detention.8 Facing the threat of torture in many of their home or 
proposed recipient countries, these individuals look to FARRA to 
stop their transfer to a country in which they believe they face a 
substantial likelihood of being tortured.9 
These FARRA claims, however, transcend the unique context 
of Guantanamo Bay military detention cases. Individuals facing 
ordinary extradition seek to raise claims of torture as well.10 
                                                                                                     
 3. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. 202, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. CAT was adopted by unanimous agreement of 
the U.N. General Assembly, was signed on April 18, 1988, and entered into force 
as to the United States on November 20, 1994. While the United States signed 
and ratified CAT, it was deemed nonself-executing. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,198 
(1990) (detailing the nature of CAT). 
 4. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2012)). 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note.  
 6. See supra note 2 (discussing the different contexts of FARRA claims). 
 7. See Samuel Chow, The Kiyemba Paradox: Creating a Judicial 
Framework to Eradicate Indefinite, Unlawful Executive Detentions, 19 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 775, 776 (2011) (discussing the difficulty in actual release of 
Guantanamo Bay detainees). 
 8. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 13492 (Jan. 22, 2009) (explaining 
the challenges the executive faced in considering detainee release options). 
 9. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692 (2008) (discussing petitioners’ 
claims that if they were surrendered to Iraqi custody they would likely face 
torture, and thus international law forbids their transfer). 
 10. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantanamo, 48 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1547, 1549–50 (2011) (discussing how the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia’s holding in a non-Guantanamo, military detention case 
may affect congressional constraints on the scope of federal habeas review in 
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Under FARRA, individuals facing extradition may challenge their 
extradition by petitioning a U.S. court through the writ of habeas 
corpus.11 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit heard one such case, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas,12 in 
2012. Garcia involved a man wanted by the Philippines to face 
kidnapping conspiracy charges.13 Facing imminent transfer, the 
man filed a habeas petition to challenge his extradition under 
FARRA, claiming he faced a likelihood of torture in the 
Philippines.14 The Ninth Circuit established jurisdiction to hear 
Trinidad’s claim based on the conclusion that federal courts have 
habeas jurisdiction to hear extradition challenge requests under 
FARRA, and held that a court’s inquiry ends once the Secretary 
of State determines that torture is not “more likely than not.”15 
Despite the intended sui generis nature of the Guantanamo Bay 
detainee transfer challenges, the Ninth Circuit referred to those 
situations for guidance16 and deemed courts unable to contradict 
Executive Branch foreign policy decisions.17 
                                                                                                     
other nonrelated cases). 
 11. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (detailing Trinidad’s claims of torture if extradited to the 
Philippines); Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Khouzam II), 549 F.3d 235, 
239 (3d Cir. 2008) (detailing Khouzam’s claims of torture if removed to Egypt); 
Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 2007) (detailing Mironescu’s 
claims of torture if extradited to Romania). 
 12. 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 13. Id. at 956. 
 14. See id. at 963 
Trinidad raises two distinct rationales for why he may not be 
extradited. First, he contends that he may “invoke the writ to challenge 
the Secretary's decision to surrender him in violation of his substantive 
due process right to be free from torture” at the hands of a foreign 
government. . . . Alternatively, he asserts that . . . he possesses a 
statutory right under the Convention and the FARR Act that precludes 
the United States from extraditing him to a country where torture is 
“more likely than not” to occur. 
(citations omitted). 
 15. Id. at 956–57. 
 16. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1549 (discussing how the reasoning in 
Omar II, and by proxy Garcia, is divorced from what was supposed to be the sui 
generis nature of post-9/11 terrorism cases). 
 17. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (“The Judiciary is not 
suited to second-guess such determinations—determinations that would require 
federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area.”); Boumediene v. 
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As this Note will explain, the Garcia decision is significant 
for two reasons. First, it suggests that the law governing ordinary 
extraditions will continue to matter long after the last detainee is 
released from Guantanamo Bay.18 Courts disagree as to whether 
they have jurisdiction to hear ordinary extradition cases raising 
claims of torture.19 Those courts that have granted jurisdiction 
have failed to provide the type of substantive review that a 
historical analysis of the development of habeas corpus law 
suggests courts should undertake in these ordinary extradition 
cases.20 Whether federal courts have habeas jurisdiction to hear 
non-Guantanamo extraditees’ FARRA claims has significant 
ramifications with regard to the rights of these individuals under 
United States law.21 And second, while FARRA applies to both 
Guantanamo Bay detainee release cases and ordinary extradition 
cases, the contexts are sufficiently dissimilar that the former 
should not inform the latter.22 This Note will instead propose a 
rule of limited inquiry that will differentiate between 
Guantanamo-specific decisions and conventional extradition 
cases. Such a rule would ensure that extraditees have sufficient 
opportunity to challenge their extradition, and guarantee that the 
United States upholds its obligations under CAT and the U.S. 
Constitution.23  
This Note addresses two main issues raised by extraditee 
transfer challenges based on FARRA: (1) whether the Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Garcia—holding that extraditees have 
                                                                                                     
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (“The habeas court must have sufficient 
authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the 
Executive’s power to detain.”); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1547–48 (discussing 
the “seepage” of doctrine from terrorism cases, notably Boumediene and Munaf, 
into “more conventional bodies of jurisprudence”). 
 18. See Vladeck, supra note 1 (discussing the importance of this 
jurisprudence). 
 19. See infra note 25 (discussing the circuit split over federal habeas 
jurisdiction). 
 20. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (explaining that, while the court has jurisdiction to hear a transferee’s 
claim, once the Secretary of State files a declaration that it is not more likely 
than not that torture will occur, the court’s review comes to an end). 
 21. See Vladeck, supra note 1 (explaining the effects of jurisdiction on 
detainee and extraditee rights). 
 22. See id. (explaining the differences between these contexts). 
 23. See infra Part VI (discussing the details of a rule of limited inquiry). 
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jurisdiction to challenge their transfers under CAT/FARRA,24 
creating a circuit split25—was correct; and (2) whether, despite 
potential bars to such attempts—including judicial precedent,26 
the doctrine of separation of powers, and the judicially created 
rule of noninquiry27—extraditees may attempt to rebut 
government assurances that torture will not occur upon 
extradition.28 
Part II of this Note reviews the legal provisions that 
establish the foundation for today’s extradition cases.29 This Part 
examines the historical roots of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
Suspension Clause30 before evaluating the statutory bases for 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (holding that the district court did have 
jurisdiction over the action because neither the FARRA nor the REAL ID Act 
repealed federal habeas jurisdiction over Trinidad’s claims, and remanding so 
the Secretary of State could comply with her obligations in making a 
determination regarding the likelihood of torture). This case will be discussed in 
detail infra Part III.B. 
 25. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 1013 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part) 
(explaining that the majority decision of the Ninth Circuit creates a circuit split 
as to the federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from individuals in 
U.S. custody hoping to challenge their transfer/extradition to a foreign 
sovereign, claiming it is more likely than not that they will be tortured). A 
circuit split has now emerged between the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. and the 
Fourth Circuits. The D.C. Circuit held in Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 
13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and the Fourth Circuit held in Mironescu v. Costner, 480 
F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2007), that the REAL ID Act of 2005 divested federal 
courts of jurisdiction in such cases. The REAL ID Act of 2005 was enacted to 
streamline judicial review in immigration cases and currently provides that “a 
[habeas] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in 
accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial 
review of any cause or claim under the [CAT] and Other Forms of Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . . . .” REAL ID Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) 
(2012)).  
 26. See infra Part V.A (discussing whether the relevant case law supports 
detainee challenges of transfer and the scope of review provided to such claims). 
 27. See infra Part V.B (discussing whether the separation of powers 
doctrine or the rule of noninquiry bars judicial review). 
 28. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[U]nder 
what is called the rule of non-inquiry in extradition law, courts in this country 
refrain from examining the penal systems of requesting nations, leaving to the 
Secretary of State determinations of whether the defendant is likely to be 
treated humanely.” (quotations omitted)). 
 29. See infra Part II (discussing CAT, FARRA, and the REAL ID Act). 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See infra Part II.A (discussing the history 
of habeas corpus and its interactions with the Constitution). 
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detainee extradition challenges including FARRA and the REAL 
ID Act.31 Part III analyzes relevant case law, including the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Garcia and the 2008 Supreme Court 
decisions32 in Boumediene v. Bush33 and Munaf v. Geren.34 Part 
IV argues that Garcia correctly determined that federal courts 
have jurisdiction over challenges to extradition based on 
FARRA,35 while Part V argues that federal courts have a 
constitutional basis—and responsibility—to provide substantive 
review in considering detainee FARRA claims.36 Part VI proposes 
a rule of limited review that courts could employ in the future to 
address these challenges in a manner consistent with the concept 
of meaningful review.37 In closing, Part VII defends the proposed 
rule, providing a basis for future debate in this expanding field 
and bridging the gap between constitutional and human rights 
law.38 
II. Habeas Corpus and the Domestic Statutory Bases for Detainee 
Challenges 
The writ of habeas corpus provides the primary 
constitutional basis by which detainees in U.S. custody may 
challenge their impending transfer to a foreign country.39 FARRA 
                                                                                                     
 31. CAT, supra note 3; Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–761 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 note (2012)); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 
310–11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2012)).  
 32. See infra Part III.A–B (discussing Boumediene, Munaf, and Garcia). 
 33. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 34. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
 35. See infra Part IV (examining the circuit split and discussing why 
Garcia’s holding on jurisdiction is more persuasive). 
 36. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing how the relevant case law supports 
challenges on CAT and FARRA grounds by individuals facing transfer and how 
the separation of power doctrine and the rule of noninquiry do not pose a bar to 
such jurisdiction). 
 37. See infra Part VI (discussing the proposal for limited judicial review). 
 38. See infra Part VI (discussing how the proposal accords with the history 
of habeas corpus and addresses the need for deference to the Executive Branch). 
 39. See John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, 
and the Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973, 2019 (2010) (explaining 
habeas’s use). 
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forms the statutory basis for such challenges when transferees 
allege they face a substantial likelihood of torture in the country 
to which they are to be transferred.40 An analysis of the bases for 
detainee transfer challenges follows and forms the foundation 
for this Note’s subsequent arguments. 
A. The Historical Roots of Habeas 
Since its introduction in English common law in the mid-
1600s, habeas corpus provided detainees a remedy to challenge 
their detention in court in order to protect the individual’s 
right41 to be free from bodily restraint.42 At its inception, courts 
in feudal England used this remedy “principally as a means to 
enforce allocations of authority between and among the various 
power centers,”43 establishing whether the court possessed 
jurisdiction to hear such claims.44 The scope of judicial review 
                                                                                                     
 40. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681–761 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2012)). 
 41. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012) (making the writ of habeas corpus 
available to all persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) 
(holding that Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional habeas corpus 
rights); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–03 (2001) (discussing the history of 
habeas corpus); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (reviewing habeas’s history as a remedy allowing challenges to 
detention); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 522–23 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (“Since at 
least the seventeenth century, the Great Writ has prohibited the transfer of 
prisoners to places beyond the [Supreme Court’s] reach where they would be 
subject to continued detention on behalf of the government.”) 
 42. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus 
Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
2029, 2101 (2007) (discussing the procedural rights of individuals challenging 
their detention or removal). 
 43. MICHAEL P. ALLEN, MICHAEL FINCH & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, FEDERAL 
COURTS 868 (2008). See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 725 (discussing the history of 
the writ of habeas corpus and corresponding judicial review). 
 44. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (detailing the contours of habeas as a remedy in England in the 1600s 
and 1700s) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–03 (2001))); Mironescu v. 
Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[th]e historical 
dichotomy in the immigration context between the limited role played by the 
courts in habeas corpus proceedings, and judicial review in which a court 
decid[es] on the whole record whether there is substantial evidence to support 
TORTUROUS TRANSFERS 2495 
quickly expanded from the mid-1600s onward, as the writ of 
habeas corpus became a tool of expansive use,45 including as a 
means to protect individual liberty from claims of unlawful 
transfer.46 
Through the writ’s derivation from British royal privilege, 
the King’s Bench commonly issued writs that lacked a basis in 
established precedent.47 Lord Chief Justice Mansfield issued a 
wide variety of writs during this period to prevent individuals 
from being unlawfully removed from England.48 This royal 
prerogative gave the writ of habeas corpus its immense and 
varied power,49 granting the release of an African slave, 
commanding the discharge of seamen exempt from 
impressments into the British Navy, and helping to free 
asylum inmates and apprentices.50 The British people saw the 
writ as so important that when the King’s Bench suspended 
the writ by royal order in the late 1600s, it inflamed the 
people, leading to the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1679 to solidify the writ’s availability and enshrine its 
importance as a check on government power.51 Further, by the 
eighteenth century, English habeas courts heard statutory 
claims that a prisoner’s detention was unlawful, expanding the 
bases of a prisoner’s claims to the Magna Carta, Parliament’s 
newest innovation.52 
                                                                                                     
administrative findings of fact” is not present in extradition). 
 45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740–44 (2008) (explaining the 
expansion of habeas corpus). 
 46. See id. at 725 (discussing the history of the writ of habeas corpus and 
corresponding judicial review); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 43, at 868–69 
(discussing habeas’s uses). 
 47. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 43, at 868–69. 
 48. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 941, 975 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM 
ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)). 
 49. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (discussing the source of habeas’s 
power). 
 50. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 303 (2001) (citing examples of 
habeas’s success in freeing detained individuals in a variety of situations). 
 51. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (discussing the 
British view of the writ of habeas corpus and the passage of the Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1679). 
 52. See Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing 
a variety of old English sources for the proposition that English habeas courts 
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The framers of the new U.S. nation’s constitution continued 
to protect and expand the power of habeas corpus after the 
United States won independence from England in the late 
1700s.53 The Constitution’s Article I Suspension Clause54 provides 
that the writ of habeas corpus “shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it,”55 thus exemplifying the framers’ view that the writ 
existed as a “vital instrument for the protection of individual 
liberty”—freedom against government power.56 The history of the 
Great Writ’s purpose in checking power in England was well 
known to the framers: 
It no doubt confirmed their view that pendular swings to and 
away from individual liberty were endemic to undivided, 
uncontrolled power. The Framers’ inherent distrust of 
government power was the driving force behind the 
constitutional plan that allocated powers among three 
independent branches. This design serves not only to make 
government accountable, but also to secure individual 
liberty.57 
But a more comprehensive analysis of the scope of the 
Suspension Clause “begin[s] with precedents as of 1789” because, 
as the Supreme Court emphasized, “‘at the absolute minimum,’ 
the [Suspension] Clause protects the writ as it existed when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified.”58 
In 1789, the writ of habeas corpus allowed individuals to 
challenge their government-ordered detention or their transfer 
beyond the habeas court’s jurisdiction.59 As a resolution during 
the New York Ratifying Convention made clear, the Suspension 
                                                                                                     
heard statutory-based claims of unlawful detention). 
 53. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–45 (discussing the use of habeas in 
1700s America). 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). 
 57. Id. at 742. 
 58. See id. at 746 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
 59. Brief of Legal Historians and Habeas Corpus Experts as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 3, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (No. 12-6615), http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Trinidad-y-Garcia-Cert-Amicus.pdf [hereinafter Brief of 
Legal Historians]. 
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Clause was intended “not only [to] protect[] against arbitrary 
suspensions of the writ but also [to] guarantee[] an affirmative 
right to judicial inquiry into causes of detention.”60 During this 
period, habeas extended to all detention “contra legem terrae,” 
meaning against the law of the land, not just those raising claims 
of torture.61 As the Supreme Court recounted: 
[T]he writ of habeas corpus was available to non-enemy aliens 
as well as to citizens. It enabled them to challenge Executive 
and private detention in civil cases as well as criminal. 
Moreover, the issuance of the writ was not limited to 
challenges to the jurisdiction of the custodian, but 
encompassed detentions based on errors of law, including the 
erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.62  
Thus, habeas provided an effective means to challenge all 
manners of illegal confinement.63 During the 1700s, there was “no 
suggestion that habeas relief in cases involving Executive 
detention was only available for constitutional error.”64 Rather, 
the Court stated that the Great Writ “has always been available 
to review the legality of Executive detention,” notwithstanding 
the basis of a detainee’s claim on “the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States.”65 Thus, in the 1800s U.S. state 
courts heard claims of unlawful detention or transfer based on 
statute.66 By allowing challenges to the Congress’s power, the 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008) (citing Resolution of 
the New York Ratifying Convention (July 26, 1788) (emphasis added)). 
 61. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 54 (Williams S. Hein Co. 1986) (1642); see also Vladeck, supra note 48, 
at 975 (noting that “the habeas jurisdiction of King’s Bench ran to any possible 
unlawful transfer, and not just to those rising claims of torture”). 
 62. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301–02 (2001). 
 63. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131. 
 64. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302–03 (quotations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 302–03, 305 (quotations omitted); see also Omar v. McHugh 
(Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Griffith, J., concurring) (discussing 
the historical availability of the writ of habeas corpus). 
 66. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302–03 (explaining the evolution of habeas 
claims); Kennedy & Co. v. Fairman, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 408 (N.C. Super. Ct. L. 
& Eq. 1796) (discussing a debtor’s claim); Respublica v. Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 
198–99 (Pa. 1793) (discussing an indentured servant’s claim); Respublica v. 
Betsey, 1 U.S. 469 (Pa. 1789) (discussing a slave’s claim); Commonwealth v. 
Downes, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 227 (1836) (discussing a military enlistee’s claim); 
In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328, 333–34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (holding that a civilian 
in military custody on accusations of treason must be released). 
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writ further operated as an “essential mechanism in the 
separation-of-powers scheme.”67 
Today, the Supreme Court continues to adhere to the 
understanding that “constitutional habeas is at least as robust as 
common law habeas was when Congress passed the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.”68 The Court explained in Boumediene that “[t]he Framers 
viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept 
of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital 
instrument to secure that freedom.”69 In this way, the writ of 
habeas corpus is a remedy, not a right, meaning its availability for 
relief does not depend on the applicability of other constitutional 
protections.70 Instead, habeas exists as an adaptable remedy, 
altered in application and scope based on the circumstances of the 
case.71 Modern courts widely accept that petitioners allege a proper 
claim for habeas relief when they request a judicial order barring 
their transfer to, or from, a place of incarceration.72 The rule, 
                                                                                                     
Further, any claim that the Suspension Clause applies only to statutory 
claims that existed in 1789 can be defeated by the claim heard in St Cyr. See 
Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the 
application of the Suspension Clause to claims beyond statutory ones). There, an 
alien filed a habeas petition seeking to block his removal under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952, which paralleled a claim first created by Congress 
in the Immigration Act of 1917. Id. Despite the statute originating in the 
twentieth century, the Court determined that the alien’s claim “could have been 
answered in 1789 by a common-law judge with power to issue the writ of habeas 
corpus” because the alien challenged “the legality of Executive detention.” St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305; see also Omar II, 646 F.3d at 28 (citing St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 
305). 
 67. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). The framers had this 
understanding as well. See id. (explaining that the framers believed the writ to 
be a vital component of separation of powers). 
 68. Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 26–27 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing 
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)). 
 69. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739. 
 70. See id. at 780 (“Habeas is, at its core, an equitable remedy.”); Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 16, 19 & 
n.23 (2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012)), http://www.uiowa.edu/ 
~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_97_Vladeck.pdf (explaining that the writ of habeas corpus is 
often mischaracterized as a right rather than a remedy). 
 71. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (explaining habeas’s adaptability). 
 72. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–08 (2001) (explaining the long 
history of judicial review of deportations through habeas petitions); In re 
Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1894) (explaining petitioner’s habeas challenge to 
his detention, holding it to be “in violation of the laws of the United States, and 
that [petitioner] was therefore entitled to be discharged from the custody of the 
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therefore, became as follows: if a prisoner can state “a colorable 
argument that his transfer is unlawful—even if he must overcome 
a strong presumption on the merits—based on the executive 
branch’s assurances, then that transfer is, in fact, unlawful.”73 
With the passage of FARRA, the Great Writ captured a new 
statutory claim, allowing individuals in U.S. custody to challenge 
their transfer to a foreign country based on their anticipated 
treatment in the receiving state.74 
B. CAT and FARRA, U.S. State Department Regulations, and the 
2005 REAL ID Act 
The United States ratified the U.N. Convention Against 
Torture (CAT) in 1994,75 Article 3 of which states that “[n]o State 
Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”76 
Congress interpreted CAT as a nonself-executing treaty,77 and 
                                                                                                     
warden of the institution”); Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462 (1888) 
(reviewing petitioner’s claim of unlawful extradition through the writ of habeas 
corpus); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(discussing whether the court has jurisdiction over petitioner’s habeas claim); 
Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“[A]ctions taken by 
magistrates in international extradition matters are subject to habeas corpus 
review by an Article III district judge.”); Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 
419–20 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (“We think it has been settled since . . . Bonner that the 
writ [of habeas corpus] is available to test the validity not only of the fact of 
confinement but also of the place of confinement.”). 
 73. Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1561; see also Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba 
II), 561 F.3d 509, 525 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment 
and dissenting in part) (arguing the habeas rights given to detainees in 
Boumediene cannot be safeguarded without allowing challenges to government 
assurances).  
 74. See Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Griffith, J., concurring) (explaining the effects of FARRA on the writ of habeas 
corpus). 
 75. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implementation of CAT). 
 76. CAT, supra note 3, at art. 3. 
 77. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008) (recounting the 
legislative history regarding the nature of CAT). As a nonself-executing treaty, 
CAT does not create rights enforceable in U.S. courts without the passage of 
domestic legislation. See id. (explaining nonself-executing treaties). 
2500 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2487 (2013) 
passed FARRA78 to effectuate U.S. international legal obligations 
under the Convention.79 FARRA provides that: 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, 
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any 
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present 
in the United States.80 
Thus, FARRA creates a statutory prohibition against 
transferring a detainee to countries in which a court determines 
that the detainee faces a “substantial” risk of torture.81 In so 
doing, FARRA extends the scope of habeas petitions to encompass 
challenges to detainee transfers on the basis that such a 
“substantial” risk exists, notwithstanding negotiated assurances 
from that country’s government to the contrary.82 Furthermore, 
FARRA’s prohibition on transfers to countries in which a 
detainee might face torture “generate[s] interests cognizable as 
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause, which guarantees 
that persons will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”83  
                                                                                                     
 78. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681–761 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2012)). 
 79. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing FARRA); Omar II, 646 
F.3d at 18 n.2 (“[I]t is undisputed that the FARR Act implements the 
Convention Against Torture.”); Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 114 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“Congress then implemented CAT in the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998.”); Pierre v. Attorney Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 185–86 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[I]n 1998, Congress passed legislation to implement the United 
States’ obligations under the CAT: the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act (‘the FARR Act’).”); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (“To implement the CAT, Congress amended the immigration laws 
with the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (‘the FARR 
Act’).”); Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1180 (11th Cir. 2004) (“In order to 
implement Article 3 of CAT, Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998 (‘the FARR Act’).”); Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 
1121 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act (the FARR Act) in 1998 to implement Article 3 of CAT.”). 
 80. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2012)). 
 81. Id.; see also Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1554 (discussing FARRA).  
 82. Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1554. 
 83. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
TORTUROUS TRANSFERS 2501 
FARRA directs relevant Executive Branch agencies to 
promulgate regulations to implement U.S. obligations under 
CAT.84 These regulations broadly address three categories of 
persons: (1) individuals subject to “expedited removal” who may 
be summarily removed from the United States upon arrival for 
lack of required documentation85 or posing a threat to national 
security;86 (2) individuals subject to immigration removal 
orders;87 and (3) individuals subject to extradition for 
prosecution in a foreign country.88 
Shortly after FARRA’s passage, the U.S. State Department 
promulgated procedural regulations to address those 
individuals subject to immigration removal orders.89 These 
                                                                                                     
curiam) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)). 
 84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2012) (explaining that FARRA requires “the 
appropriate agencies . . . prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of 
the United States under Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture”). 
 85. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2013).  
 86. Id. at § 235.8. 
 87. COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF 
N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO 
“EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS” 50 (2004) [hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY], 
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 15–16.  
 89. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–208.17 (stating the regulations for FARRA 
implementation); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (stating that the U.S. Department of State is the appropriate 
agency under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 that must prescribe regulations to implement U.S. 
obligations under CAT). This accords with case law stating, “[i]t is the function 
of the Secretary of State to determine whether extradition should be denied on 
humanitarian grounds.” Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.3d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990); 
see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122–23 (1901) (explaining that “the 
appellant cannot be extradited except upon the order of a judge of a court of the 
United States”); Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that 
“humanitarian considerations are within the purview of the executive 
branch . . . in deciding whether a petitioner is extraditable”); United States v. 
Kin Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110–11 & nn. 11–12 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that “the 
Secretary may also decline to surrender the [petitioner] on any number of 
discretionary grounds, including . . . humanitarian and foreign policy 
considerations”); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326–27 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(stating that “the Secretary of State may order surrender of an American citizen 
whose extradition had been requested” (quotations omitted)); Jacques 
Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non Inquiry in 
International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1198 (1991) 
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regulations90 state that the Secretary of State (the Secretary), 
before approving the removal of an individual relying on FARRA 
to prevent his transfer, must determine whether the potential 
transferee is “more likely than not”91 to be tortured in the 
receiving country92 based on an analysis of relevant U.S. 
government and nongovernmental organization reports.93 If in 
considering the petitioner’s CAT/FARRA claim the immigration 
                                                                                                     
(same). 
 90. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–208.17 (2013).  
 91. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4); see also S. Res. of Advice and Consent to 
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 101st Cong. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. 
36,193 (using the same standard as the regulation); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 
30 (1990) (“That the United States understands the phrase ‘where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture,’ as used in Article 3 of the Convention to mean ‘if it is more likely 
than not that he would be tortured.’”); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the 
Convention: Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, Addendum: 
United States, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3, at 57 (Jan. 13, 2006) (explaining the 
standard for assessing torture). The “more likely than not” standard originates 
from the test used for relief from removal in persecution cases. See Tanusri 
Prasanna, Taking Remedies Seriously: The Normative Implications of Risking 
Torture, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 370, 393–94 (2012); see John T. Parry, 
Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1039 (2009) (claiming that 
“[t]he goal of the understanding was to conform the Convention to existing U.S. 
immigration law, which prevents a person from being deported to a country 
where it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted”). 
 92. See S. Res. of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 101st Cong. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. 36,193 (explaining the Senate’s 
understanding in ratifying CAT, involving “the phrase where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected 
to torture” as being construed to mean “if it more likely than not that he would 
be tortured” (quotations omitted)); Lyle Denniston, Munaf’s Impact Widens 
Again, SCOTUSBLOG (June 10, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2012/06/munafs-impact-widens-again/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing the 
Secretary’s process of review and certification) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (stating that “[a]n extraditee may be surrendered only 
after the Secretary makes a determination regarding possible torture” and 
explaining a determination prior to surrender of an extraditee who makes a 
CAT claim is mandatory (citing 22 C.F.R. § 95.2–.3)).  
 93. See Brief of Appellee at 13–14, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 
952 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (No. 09-56999) [hereinafter Garcia Brief of 
Appellee], 2010 WL 4199736 at *14 (detailing the sources used in making a 
determination about the likelihood of torture).  
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judge decides the petitioner is more likely than not to be tortured 
in the receiving state, FARRA entitles the individual to 
protection, typically by preventing his removal.94 
The same inquiry occurs for persons facing extradition for 
prosecution in a foreign country.95 Under State Department 
FARRA regulations, the standard procedure for extradition 
begins with a judicial determination that an individual is 
extraditable, before the Secretary makes the final extradition 
decision.96 During this process, the individual may raise a claim 
under CAT/FARRA that he is likely to be tortured in the 
requesting state.97 In such a case, the Secretary considers the 
potential extraditee’s claim on the basis of “the existence in the 
State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights.”98 The Secretary’s extradition decision 
is not subject to judicial review.99  
While FARRA took important steps to realize CAT’s aims, 
the Executive Branch regulations implementing CAT/FARRA’s 
nonrefoulement (nontransfer) obligations failed to establish clear 
procedural guidelines by which potential transferees may refute 
Executive Branch determinations denying their torture claims.100 
As a result, “there appears to be nothing to prevent arbitrary 
decisions and no procedural safeguards to ensure compliance 
with U.S. obligations under CAT and FARRA,” particularly in the 
extradition context.101 More drastically, however, some courts 
                                                                                                     
 94. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (explaining the process an immigration judge 
must take in considering a petition for withholding of removal due to torture 
under CAT). 
 95. See 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (detailing the procedures for extraditees 
challenging their extradition pursuant to CAT and FARRA). 
 96. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 87, at 53 (reviewing how the process 
truly works when the Secretary considers a petition for extradition).  
 97. Id. 
 98. 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(a)(2) (2013). 
 99. See 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (2013) (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning 
surrender of fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion not 
subject to judicial review.”). 
 100. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 87, at 54 (arguing that shortcomings 
in the CAT- and FARRA-implementing regulations have made it difficult for 
potential transferees to refute Executive Branch assurances). 
 101. Id. For these reasons—and to address this problem—this Note will 
propose a rule of limited inquiry in these cases to ensure the Executive has 
incentive to abide by its CAT and FARRA obligations. Infra Part VI.  
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subsequently interpreted FARRA to foreclose administrative and 
judicial review in extradition cases, denying federal courts 
requisite jurisdiction to hear transferees’ claims.102  
Subsequent to FARRA, Congress passed the 2005 REAL ID 
Act103 to streamline judicial review of immigration cases.104 The 
Act provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, . . . or any other 
habeas corpus provision, . . .  a petition for review filed with an 
appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive 
means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the 
United Nations [CAT] . . . .105  
The REAL ID Act intended to ensure that this provision 
represented the “sole and exclusive means” for courts to hear 
CAT claims, even in habeas petitions.106 While the provision 
appears to restrict judicial review to removal order challenges,107 
the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did not 
intend to limit detainees’ substantive right under FARRA to 
challenge their extradition based on claims of torture risk.108 
Thus, petitioners used these laws to challenge their transfer in 
the military detention and extradition settings.109 
                                                                                                     
 102. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 87, at 54 (discussing the courts that 
denied jurisdiction to review extradition cases under FARRA). 
 103. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012)). 
 104. Id. The relevant portion affects 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2012). See 
Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1567 (explaining the congressional reasoning for 
passing the REAL ID Act). 
 105. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.; see Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1555 (discussing the effects of the 
provision). 
 108. H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 176 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); see Gerald L. Neuman, 
On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.U. SCH. 
L. REV. 133, 137 n.17 (2006) (discussing the legislative history). 
 109. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692 (2008) (explaining the challenge 
to military detention under FARRA); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 673 F.3d 
952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (explaining the extradition challenge 
under FARRA). 
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III. The Foundational Cases 
After the passage of FARRA, challenges under the statute 
arose in Guantanamo Bay detainee release cases and ordinary 
extradition proceedings.110 The Supreme Court’s holdings in two 
2008 Guantanamo-related cases examined detainee release 
challenges based on the unlawful nature of such a transfer.111 
These cases, however, set the stage for the challenges in the 
extradition context under FARRA.112 The following Part will 
consider the cases and their impacts in turn. 
A. The D.C. Circuit’s Guantanamo Jurisprudence  
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress enacted the 
Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF),113 granting 
authority to the President of the United States to use “necessary 
and appropriate force” against the individuals, nonstate actors, 
groups, or organizations responsible for and involved in the 
attacks.114 Under AUMF, the government detained hundreds of 
terrorism suspects and sent them to the detention facility at the 
U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay.115 But after a few years 
of confinement without criminal charges, this form of detention 
led to complaints.116  
                                                                                                     
 110. See supra note 109 (discussing two contexts raising FARRA claims). 
 111. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (holding that 
Guantanamo Bay detainees are entitled to the writ of habeas corpus to 
challenge their detention); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90 (holding that the Court 
could not prevent the transfer of detainees in the custody of the U.S. military to 
Iraqi authorities to stand trial for alleged crimes). 
 112. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (examining FARRA in the context of the proposed extradition of 
Trinidad to the Philippines). 
 113. Authorization of Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)).  
 114. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (citing S.J. Res. 23, 
107th Cong. (2001) (enacted)). 
 115. Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (Cuba), N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/national/usstatesterritoriesandpossessions/g
uantanamobaynavalbasecuba/index.html, (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 116. Jennifer L. Milko, Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: 
Defining the Proper Roles of the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and 
2506 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2487 (2013) 
In 2002, some detainees at Guantanamo Bay began to file 
habeas petitions to challenge their status and detention.117 After 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
detainees’ petitions on the basis that they lacked jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court reversed that decision, ruling that district courts 
do possess jurisdiction to hear detainees’ habeas petitions.118 
In response, the government implemented necessary due 
process procedures to enhance the legal legitimacy of the 
detentions.119 Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) were 
developed and tasked with deciding whether Guantanamo 
detainees were in fact “enemy combatants”—the requisite 
standard to lawfully detain a person.120 
Congress followed suit in attempting to circumvent the 
Supreme Court’s ruling and facilitate the continuing detentions 
at Guantanamo Bay, passing the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) 
in 2005.121 DTA effectively stripped the courts of federal habeas 
jurisdiction to hear claims of Guantanamo detainees,122 and 
granted the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exclusive 
jurisdiction to review CSRT decisions.123 After the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
the Need for Supreme Guidance, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 176 (2012). 
 117. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734 (holding that the district courts had 
jurisdiction to hear detainee habeas petitions, which they had a constitutional 
right to file). 
 118. See id. (reviewing the legislative history in the Boumediene case).  
 119. See id. (explaining the government-instituted procedures implemented 
to create a solid legal basis for detention). 
 120. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 
2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam), reinstated as amended, 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (discussing the use of CSRTs and the standards they 
employ). The D.C. District Court defined an “enemy combatant” as “an 
individual who was part of or supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners.” Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 36; see 
also Milko, supra note 116, at 177 n.21 (discussing the CSRTs and the enemy 
combatant standard). 
 121. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 
(codified as amended in various sections of titles 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 122. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 735 (2008) (discussing the 
congressional motive behind the passage of the DTA and DTA’s effects on 
jurisdiction). 
 123. See id. at 735 (discussing the effects of the DTA). 
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Court ruled that DTA did not apply to petitions currently 
pending before the district court,124 Congress responded by 
passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006,125 
Section 7 of which stripped federal jurisdiction from pending 
and future Guantanamo detention and transfer cases.126 In 
passing the MCA—and particularly Section 7—Congress set 
the stage for the Court’s landmark 2008 ruling in 
Boumediene.127 
In Boumediene, six Algerians detained at Guantanamo 
Bay—due to their alleged connections to al Qaeda or the 
Taliban and their alleged plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in 
Sarajevo128— petitioned the D.C. District Court for a writ of 
habeas corpus to challenge their detention, which the court 
denied.129 The Supreme Court took the case on appeal130 and on 
June 12, 2008, in a 5–4 decision, ruled that Lakhdar 
Boumediene and other prisoners held by the U.S. military at 
Guantanamo Bay possess a constitutional right to challenge 
their detention in the U.S. court system through a habeas 
petition.131 Habeas forces the government to justify the 
individual’s continued detention,132 and further requires a 
prisoner be provided “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate 
that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous application or 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576–77 (2006) (holding that the 
DTA does not apply to petitions currently pending before the district court). 
 125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 
(codified as amended in various sections of titles 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 126. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 
Stat. 2600, 2635–36 (2006) (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)); see 
also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735 (detailing the effects of the MCA on 
jurisdiction). 
 127. See Milko, supra note 116, at 178 (explaining how the passage of the 
MCA led the way for the detainees’ petition in Boumediene, challenging their 
detention in U.S. court). 
 128. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008). 
 129. See id. (discussing the history of the Algerian detainees’ petition). 
 130. Id. at 735–36. 
 131. See id. at 771 (“Petitioners, therefore, are entitled to the privilege of 
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”). The Court held this 
privilege to be constitutional and it is not to be withdrawn “except in 
conformance with the Suspension Clause.” Id. at 732.  
 132. Id.  
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interpretation of relevant law.”133 The Court explained that the 
habeas court must “have the power to order the conditional 
release of an individual unlawfully detained—though release 
need not be the exclusive remedy.”134 Instead, the current 
review procedures employed by the DTA served as an 
insufficient substitute based on the historical nature of the 
Great Writ.135 Further, Section 7 of the MCA 
unconstitutionally suspended the writ without providing an 
adequate alternative, impermissibly violating the Suspension 
Clause, which the Court held “has full effect” for Guantanamo 
detainees.136 Though heralded as a monumental win for 
detainees, the Court had more to come.137 
In its second landmark decision on June 12, 2008, Munaf 
v. Geren, the Court unanimously held that a federal judge has 
no power to enjoin U.S. military forces in Iraq from turning 
over two U.S. citizens for criminal prosecution in Iraqi 
courts.138 Here, the two petitioners, Shawqi Ahmad Omar and 
Mohammed Munaf, separately requested the D.C. District 
Court to enjoin their transfers because they feared that they 
would be mistreated or tortured in Iraqi custody.139 The 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 779 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 134. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 792 (2008). Under what was then 
the current review process under DTA, courts of appeal could not examine 
evidence outside the CSRT record, preventing them from considering any 
evidence unavailable at the time of the initial CSRT hearing. Id. at 789–90. The 
Supreme Court found this “troubling.” Id. at 787–88. The Court also found 
disconcerting the lack of language in the DTA permitting the remedy of release, 
but the Court determined such a remedy could be implied from the language of 
the statute. Id. 
 135. See id. (explaining the insufficiency of review under the DTA). 
 136. Id. at 792.  
 137. See Milko, supra note 116, at 179 (arguing that the Boumediene 
decision was a positive statement of detainee rights). 
 138. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 698–99 (2008) (“Rather, ‘the same 
principles of comity and respect for foreign sovereigns that preclude judicial 
scrutiny of foreign convictions necessarily render invalid attempts to shield 
citizens from foreign prosecution in order to preempt such nonreviewable 
adjudications.’” (quoting Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(Brown, J., dissenting in part) (quotations omitted))).  
 139. See id. at 700 (“Petitioners contend that these general principles are 
trumped in their cases because their transfer to Iraqi custody is likely to result 
in torture.”); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1550–51 (discussing the two separate 
habeas petitions from Omar and Munaf). The pair’s petitions were consolidated 
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Supreme Court found the detainees’ status in U.S. military 
custody sufficient to trigger federal habeas jurisdiction.140  
Regarding petitioners’ claims of transfer leading to torture 
and mistreatment, the Court deferred to the Solicitor General, 
accepting his statements “that it is the policy of the United 
States not to transfer an individual in circumstances where 
torture is likely to result,”141 and that “the [U.S.] State 
Department has determined that the [Iraqi] Justice Ministry—
the department that would have authority over Munaf and 
Omar—as well as its prison and detention facilities have 
generally met internationally accepted standards for basic 
prisoner needs.”142  
Finally, the Court turned to whether FARRA might 
otherwise entitle petitioners to a statutory remedy, but did not 
rule on the issue because the petitioners failed to properly 
raise it.143 Thus, the Government prevailed: “[t]he Judiciary is 
not suited to second-guess such determinations—
determinations that would require federal courts to pass 
judgment on foreign justice systems and under the 
Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area.”144 
B. A Lasting Legacy: Beyond the War on Terror and into 
Ordinary Extradition 
Lower court judges read Chief Justice Roberts’s language 
in Munaf as a forceful directive not to second-guess the 
government’s judgment about the necessity of detention for 
                                                                                                     
for oral argument. Id. at 1552.  
 140. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 686–88. 
 141. Id. at 702 (emphasis added). 
 142. Id. (quotations omitted). 
 143. See id. at 703 (stating that FARRA might provide the petitioners with a 
statutory remedy, but declining to decide the issue); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 
1554 (explaining that the Supreme Court acknowledged a potential remedy 
under FARRA, but did not answer the question). This seemed a bit ironic, as the 
parties barely addressed the merits of the case at oral argument or in their 
briefs, instead focusing on the jurisdiction issue before the Court. Id. at 1554–
55. While the Court proceeded to decide the merits anyway, it sidestepped the 
FARRA claims for want of proper pleading. Id. 
 144. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008). 
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prisoners anywhere and in any context145—including extradition.146 
After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Boumediene and Munaf, the 
D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit considered over 200 habeas 
petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees.147 By 2011, a 
clear trend emerged.148 Detainees prevailed in the majority of cases 
in the D.C. District Court, which read Boumediene to grant 
detainees power to effectuate their release from U.S. custody, or to 
require that they receive notice that the government plans to 
transfer them to a foreign country before that transfer can occur.149 
But the government denied the habeas petitions, and the D.C. 
Circuit Court, interpreting Munaf to require it to defer to the 
Executive Branch,150  
                                                                                                     
 145. See id. (stating that the court should not second-guess Executive 
Branch determinations on the need for detention); Lyle Denniston, Munaf’s 
Impact Widens Again, SCOTUSBLOG (June 10, 2012, 8:18 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/munafs-impact-widens-again/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2013) (discussing Munaf’s effects on lower courts) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (explaining that once the Secretary declares torture unlikely, the 
inquiry comes to an end). 
 147. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5–4, Back Detainee Appeals for 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
06/13/washington/13scotus.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. See Lyle Denniston, Boumediene: The Record So Far, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 2, 2011, 11:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/boumediene (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2013) (arguing for a trend in the Guantanamo Bay detainee rights 
cases) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. See id. (explaining the reading of Boumediene by the D.C. District Court 
as one that mandated the release of many detainees); Greenhouse, supra note 147 
(stating that detainees were at least entitled to receive notice of their transfer 
prior to its occurrence).  
 150. See Denniston, supra note 145 (discussing the result of detainee petitions 
after review beyond the D.C. District Court). Despite numerous petitions for 
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court never reached the merits, denying 
certiorari in most cases and leaving the D.C. Circuit desperately in need of 
guidance and clarification. Id. The Supreme Court failed to address the merits of 
all eight certiorari petitions on Guantanamo detainee issues at the end of the 2010 
term. Id. Detainees filed new petitions each term on these issues and the courts’ 
interpretation of the law. Id.; see also Milko, supra note 116, at 175 & n.14 (“At 
the end of the 2010 Supreme Court Term, all eight petitions for certiorari on 
various Guantanamo detainee issues failed to be addressed on the merits. 
Additional petitions for certiorari pertaining to detainees’ rights and the D.C. 
Circuit’s interpretation of the law on these matters continue to be filed.” (citations 
omitted)). Some even claimed that today’s cases serve as powerful evidence that 
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did not order the detainees’ release.151 
The Supreme Court, however, had not intended for the D.C. 
Circuit to adopt such a broad, deferential interpretation of its 
ruling in Munaf.152 The Court viewed Munaf as a fact-specific, 
limited holding regarding foreign justice systems and individuals 
in a foreign country.153 Under the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation, 
however, the Munaf ruling began to be used as a 
transsubstantive rule, and its holdings began to seep into 
nonwar-related extradition cases as well.154 In essence,  
whereas Munaf was an extradition case resting on 
circumstances-specific factual determination about the 
likelihood that the detainees faced mistreatment at the hands 
                                                                                                     
“judges are [now] effectively robo-signing habeas denials and rubber stamping 
government allegations.” Press Release, Seton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law: Ctr. for 
Policy & Research, Seton Hall Law Report Reveals Courts Deny GTMO Habeas 
Relief and Fail to Reject Government Allegations at Unusually High Rates Since 
Appeals Court Decision in 2010 (May 2, 2012) (last visited Mar. 1, 2013), available 
at http://law.shu.edu/About/News_Events/releases.cfm? id=289524 (quoting  Seton 
Hall University Law Professor and leading author of the cited report, Mark 
Denbeaux) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 151. Lyle Denniston, Down to the Last on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (May. 23, 
2011, 10:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/05/down-to-the-last-on-
detainees/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). It is important to point out that many detainees were in fact released 
from Guantanamo; the U.S. State Department counted 520 detainees released 
from 2002–2008. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced 
(Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release. aspx?releaseid=12394 
(“Since 2002, approximately 520 detainees have departed Guantánamo . . . .”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Al-Marri v. Bush, No. Civ. A.04-
2035(GK), 2005 WL 774843, at *4 (D.D.C Apr. 4, 2005) (“Several of the 65 
[transferees] have been transferred to countries that our own State Department 
has acknowledged torture prisoners, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Morocco.”). As of January 2013, the number of current detainees at Guantanamo 
is down to 166; 86 were cleared for release by the government in 2009, but still 
remain. Guantánamo by the Numbers, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/guantanamo-numbers (last visited Mar. 3, 
2013) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH and the N.Y. TIMES) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 152. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 686–88 (2008) (explaining that this 
case was different because the petitioner, in U.S. military custody, was not 
asking for release into Iraqi custody, but rather the exact opposite—shelter from 
Iraqi custody); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1550 (discussing the limited holding of 
Munaf). 
 153. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1550 (discussing how the Supreme Court 
intended Munaf to have narrow effect). 
 154. Id. 
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of a specific foreign sovereign (i.e., Iraq), the D.C. Circuit held 
that it also applied to preclude notice of judicial review of a 
detainee’s involuntary non-criminal transfer to an as-yet-
undetermined country about which no specific determinations 
could have been made.155  
Thus, Munaf’s “highly narrow analysis” became “a general rule 
purporting to bar judicial second-guessing of the executive branch 
in any case in which a detainee in U.S. custody faced transfer to 
the custody of a foreign sovereign.”156 The Court explained in 
Munaf that decisions requiring foreign policy expertise and 
diplomatic tools remain the prerogative of the Executive, allowing 
the government to speak with one voice without fear of judicial 
challenge.157  
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts left a caveat in his Munaf 
opinion: a more extreme case may arise that would warrant a 
different outcome.158 Such a situation could take many forms, 
including: (1) one in which “the Executive has determined that a 
detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him 
anyway;”159 (2) one in which “the probability of torture is well 
documented, . . . [but] the Executive fails to acknowledge it;”160 or 
(3) one in which “the transfer process may be a ruse—and a fraud 
on the court—designed to maintain control over the detainees 
beyond the reach of the writ.”161 Regarding the final point, the 
D.C. Circuit intimated that transferees could establish such a 
case by presenting evidence contradicting recipient government 
assurances that they would not be tortured.162 While such a 
situation might warrant a different holding, the Court in Munaf 
                                                                                                     
 155. Id. at 1559 (citing Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 515 
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
 156. Id. at 1559–60.  
 157. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (explaining government 
transfer determinations based on assessment of the foreign country’s legal 
system and the ability to obtain reliable diplomatic assurances). 
 158. See id. (explaining the caveat); infra notes 159–61 (same).  
 159. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702. 
 160. See id. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining an additional 
situation that he would extend the Chief Justice Roberts’ caveat to cover as an 
extreme case not addressed by the Court’s holding in Munaf). 
 161. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 521 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 162. See id. (suggesting that detainees might be able to combat government 
assurances). 
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did not provide an answer for a case on those facts.163 Further, 
the D.C. Circuit stopped short of declaring the judiciary 
powerless to intervene, thereby leaving room to grant greater 
judicial inquiry into the soundness of the government assurances 
in some situations.164 
The Ninth Circuit faced one such extradition case potentially 
qualifying for greater judicial inquiry in Trinidad y Garcia v. 
Thomas in 2012.165 The Philippines sought extradition of Hedelito 
Trinidad y Garcia in connection with his alleged participation in 
a kidnap-for-ransom conspiracy.166 Garcia asked whether courts 
may inquire into Executive Branch assurances that an individual 
facing extradition will not be tortured by the country to which his 
extradition is being sought.167 Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
held that, although federal courts have jurisdiction to hear such a 
habeas petition, the courts may not provide relief from 
extradition so long as the Secretary of State complies with her 
statutory and regulatory obligations.168  
The Secretary must examine whether it is “more likely than 
not” that the extraditee will be tortured upon return.169 If she 
does not have evidence to meet the “more likely than not” 
standard, she must certify, through the filing of a formal 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Munaf v. Geren, 683 F.3d 674, 703 (2008) (presenting the situation 
but declining to answer it in the Munaf case). 
 164. See Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514 n.5 (noting that while more extreme 
cases may exist where the “executive has determined that a detainee is likely to 
be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway,” neither this case, nor Munaf, is 
such a case).  
 165. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam). 
 166. Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *5. 
 167. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (discussing the question presented). Judge 
Berzon framed Trinidad’s claim: “because the FARR Act prohibits extradition if, 
on the information available to the Secretary, he more likely than not will be 
tortured, the Secretary’s decision to extradite him would be illegal under 
positive, Congressionally enacted federal law.” Id. at 987 (Berzon, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 168. See id. at 957 (majority opinion) (stating that if the Secretary declares 
that it is not “more likely than not” that torture will occur, “the court’s inquiry 
shall have reached its end and Trinidad y Garcia’s liberty interest shall be fully 
vindicated”). This accords with State Department regulations. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 
(2012) (“Decisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for 
extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial review.”). 
 169. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4.  
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document, that the extraditee in question will not be tortured 
upon return.170 According to the Garcia majority, such a 
declaration fulfills the extraditee’s liberty interest and forecloses 
further review despite any evidence the extraditee may have to 
counter the veracity of the State Department’s negotiated 
assurances that the transferee will not be tortured.171  
By expressly foreclosing any supervisory role and declaring 
“[t]o the extent that we have previously implied greater judicial 
review of the substance of the Secretary’s extradition decision 
other than compliance with her obligations under domestic 
law, . . . we overrule that precedent,”172 the Ninth Circuit denied 
Trinidad any opportunity to rebut the Secretary’s assurances.173 
Moreover, the court refused to address the specific substantive 
claims that the extraditee raised under CAT/FARRA.174 
Several factors indicate that Trinidad’s case warranted 
judicial review under Chief Justice Roberts’s Munaf caveat.175 
First, while U.S. courts refrain from evaluating the strength of 
the case or the criminal justice system of a foreign country when 
considering extradition requests,176 the Philippine government’s 
evidence supporting its extradition request hardly implicated 
Trinidad.177 As the U.S. magistrate judge in the case 
acknowledged, “if the matter rested on [this] evidence . . . alone, 
                                                                                                     
 170. Id. 
 171. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that the Secretary’s declaration ends the inquiry). 
 172. Id. (citations omitted).  
 173. See id. (holding that Trinidad would not be allowed to present evidence 
to rebut the Secretary’s determination based on 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2012)). 
 174. Id.  
 175. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (suggesting that there 
might be “more extreme case[s] in which the Executive has determined that a 
detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway”). 
 176. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 668–68 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(“[U]nder what is called the rule of non-inquiry in extradition law, courts in 
this country refrain from examining the penal systems of requesting nations, 
leaving to the Secretary of State determinations of whether the defendant is 
likely to be treated humanely.” (citing Lopez–Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 
1327 (9th Cir. 1997)) (quotations omitted)). 
 177. See Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *5–9 (reviewing the 
evidence presented by the Philippines as its basis for requesting Trinidad’s 
extradition). Among other issues, this included a coerced confession implicating 
Trinidad that the court later threw out, and a highly suspect identification. Id. 
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the court would be hard pressed to find that there was a 
sufficient showing of probable cause connecting Trinidad to the 
crime.”178 More importantly, Trinidad presented six volumes of 
exhibits to support his CAT/FARRA claim that he credibly feared 
torture in the Philippines.179 “These records, consisting of court 
documents, police reports, sworn testimonies, and human rights 
reports, established the Philippines Government’s systemic use of 
torture.”180 From detailed accounts of horrific treatment and 
brutal techniques used on Trinidad’s alleged coconspirators,181 to 
reports of gross and flagrant human rights violations, including 
the prolific use of summary execution,182 the veracity of 
Trinidad’s claim seemed clear.183 Nonetheless, the Secretary of 
State denied Trinidad’s requests for a CAT/FARRA hearing and 
an opportunity to review and rebut evidence offered by the 
Philippines Government, stating: “there is no formal hearing 
process for this decision [to extradite].”184 With that solitary 
explanation, Trinidad ran out of options.185  
But the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Garcia created a circuit 
split.186 Federal courts disagreed on whether they possess the 
authority to even hear challenges to extradition orders or 
FARRA-based transfer challenges.187 The Ninth Circuit, in 
Garcia, ruled that federal courts do possess such authority, a 
                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at *9. 
 179. Id. at *14. 
 180. Id. Many of the reports came from the U.S. State Department. See id. 
(detailing the source of the reports on human rights in the Philippines).  
 181. See id. at *15–24 (detailing shootings, suffocations, beatings, and 
executions). 
 182. Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *23. These reports came 
from the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and the Philippine 
Government’s own Commission on Human Rights. Id. 
 183. See id. at *15–24 (arguing that the extensive documentation of torture 
in the Philippines and of Trinidad’s alleged coconspirators made it very likely 
Trinidad would be tortured). 
 184. Id. at *24. 
 185. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam). This was truly the end for Trinidad, as the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on January 7, 2013. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 133 S.Ct. 845, 845 
(2013). 
 186. See supra note 25 (discussing the circuit split on the question of 
whether federal habeas jurisdiction exists to consider CAT and FARRA claims). 
 187. See supra note 25 (discussing the circuit split). 
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departure from the Fourth and the D.C. Circuits’ rulings in 
Mironescu188 and Omar II denying federal courts’ habeas 
jurisdiction over extraditions or FARRA-based transfer 
challenges.189 But as the Supreme Court has cautioned, a judicial 
determination that a statute precludes habeas review should not 
be lightly concluded.190 This Note will argue that the Fourth and 
the D.C. Circuits came to the incorrect conclusion. 
IV. Establishing Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction over FARRA 
Challenges to Detainee Extradition Orders 
Garcia created a circuit split between the Ninth Circuit on 
one hand and the Fourth and D.C. Circuits on the other191 as to 
“whether Congress can strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction to 
consider a statutory claim [under CAT/FARRA] that a transfer is 
unlawful.”192 The Fourth and D.C. Circuits held that FARRA 
stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over CAT/FARRA 
claims because FARRA and the REAL ID Act provide a 
sufficiently “clear statement” of intent to deprive courts of such 
jurisdiction.193 As this Part will argue, the Ninth Circuit in 
Garcia correctly held the opposite: FARRA and the REAL ID Act 
fail to provide such a statement, thus retaining federal courts’ 
jurisdiction over CAT/FARRA challenges.194 
                                                                                                     
 188. Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 189. See supra note 25  (discussing the circuit split); infra Part IV (same). 
 190. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001) (stating that a decision 
that a statute strips the availability of habeas review should be avoided if 
possible); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (same). 
 191. Compare Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 952 (9th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam) (holding that FARRA/REAL ID Act do not strip federal 
habeas jurisdiction), with Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 17, 18 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (holding that FARRA/REAL ID Act do strip the courts of habeas 
jurisdiction), and Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(same). 
 192. Omar II, 646 F.3d at 26 (Griffith, J., concurring). 
 193. See id. at 17, 18 (majority opinion) (holding that FARRA and the REAL 
ID Act strip the courts of habeas jurisdiction); Mironescu, 480 F.3d at 674 
(same). 
 194. Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956.  
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A. Omar II and Mironescu: Attempts to Limit Jurisdiction to 
Final Orders of Removal 
In Omar II, the D.C. Circuit read FARRA and the REAL ID 
Act as divesting federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over 
CAT/FARRA claims.195 The Supreme Court ruled on Shawqi 
Omar’s first habeas petition196 as part of its Munaf decision197 
that it could not stop Omar from being turned over to Iraqi 
authorities for prosecution.198 Following that decision, Omar 
amended his petition to claim that FARRA and the REAL ID Act 
granted him a statutory and constitutional right to judicial 
review of conditions affecting his potential likelihood of being 
tortured in Iraqi custody prior to his transfer to that country for 
prosecution.199  
Ignoring previous circuit court decisions finding that FARRA 
could be enforced through habeas,200 the D.C. Circuit in Omar II 
                                                                                                     
 195. See Omar II, 646 F.3d at 17 (“[Th]is Court has already held that the 
FARR Act, as supplemented by the REAL ID Act of 2005, does not give military 
transferees such as Omar that right.”). 
 196. Id. The D.C. Circuit recounted Omar’s situation: 
Shawqi Omar is a dual citizen of Jordan and the United States. Since 
2004, the U.S. military has detained Omar in Iraq based on evidence 
that Omar participated in al Qaeda’s terrorist activities there. The 
United States apparently intends to transfer Omar to the custody of 
Iraq’s government. But since 2005, Omar has pursued a habeas 
corpus petition in the U.S. court system seeking to block his transfer.  
Id. at 14. 
 197. Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692–703 (2008) (discussing Omar’s initial habeas 
petition where he claimed: (1) habeas and due process rights against transfer if 
he was likely to be tortured upon removal, and (2) “right to judicial review of 
conditions in the receiving country before he could be transferred” (quoting 
Omar II, 646 F.3d at 15)). The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Omar’s 
arguments in 2008. Id. 
 198. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (stating that the Court could not prevent 
Omar and Munaf from being turned over to Iraqi authorities to be tried for 
alleged violations of Iraqi law). 
 199. See Omar II, 646 F.3d at 15 (laying out Omar’s arguments in his 
amended petition). 
 200. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1564 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit nevertheless 
ignored other circuit court decisions holding that FARRA could be enforced via 
habeas . . . .”). See, e.g., Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 193 (1st Cir. 2003); 
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that FARRA could 
be enforced through habeas); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 209 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (same); Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 
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read § 2242(d) of FARRA to provide “a right to judicial review of 
conditions in the receiving country only in the immigration 
context, for aliens seeking review of a final order of removal.”201 
According to the D.C. Circuit, Omar’s status as a detainee in U.S. 
military custody facing transfer—“not an alien seeking review of 
a final order of removal under the immigration laws”—prevented 
him from receiving any right to judicial review of conditions in 
Iraq under FARRA.202 Claiming FARRA never conferred a 
substantive right allowing challenges to detainee transfer cases 
other than in the context of removal proceedings, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the jurisdictional issue in the FARRA context was 
moot.203  
The D.C. Circuit further reasoned that the 2005 REAL ID 
Act deprived extraditees and military transferees of any 
hypothetical substantive right to have their claims heard.204 The 
court read the REAL ID Act as restricting the right to judicial 
review to immigration transferees seeking review of their final 
removal orders.205 Because Omar was “not subject to a removal 
order and ha[d] not filed—and, as a military transferee, [was] not 
eligible to file—a petition for review under section 242 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,” the REAL ID Act supported 
the court’s conclusion that Omar “possesse[d] no statutory right 
to judicial review of conditions in the receiving country.”206  
                                                                                                     
2000) (same). See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Comment, Non-Self-Executing 
Treaties and the Suspension Clause After St. Cyr; Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 113 
YALE L.J. 2007, 2008–11 (2004) (discussing the rationale behind the court of 
appeals holdings that interpreted FARRA to avoid divesting federal courts of 
habeas jurisdiction).  
 201. Omar II, 646 F.3d at 17 (emphasis added). 
 202. Id. at 17–18; Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 674–76 (4th Cir. 
2007) (holding that FARRA only allows claims by immigration detainees facing 
a final order of removal); Munaf, 553 U.S. at 703 n.6 (explaining that “claims 
under the FARR Act may be limited to certain immigration proceedings”). 
 203. Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
 204. Id. at 22–23. 
 205. See id. at 22 (“REAL ID Act merely confirmed what the FARR Act 
said—that only immigration transferees may obtain judicial review of conditions 
in the receiving country.”); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
§ 1252(a)(4), 119 Stat. 231, 310–11 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012)).  
 206. Omar II, 646 F.3d  at 18. 
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In 2007, the Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Mironescu.207 Petru Mironescu, who was wanted by Romanian 
authorities on automobile theft charges, filed a habeas petition 
asking the court to block his extradition on the grounds that he 
faced a credible threat of torture.208 The Fourth Circuit denied his 
petition, holding that the REAL ID Act, in conjunction with 
§ 2242(d) of FARRA, deprived federal courts of habeas 
jurisdiction to hear claims under CAT and FARRA.209 
But not all circuits agreed with the Fourth and D.C. Circuits’ 
conclusions.210 Some looked to alternative statutory 
interpretations, the historic uses for writs of habeas corpus, and 
customary international law211 in arriving at the common, critical 
conclusion that federal courts possess jurisdiction to hear 
extraditees’ CAT and FARRA claims.212 
B. Garcia and Beyond: The Case for Federal Jurisdiction  
Contrary to the Fourth and D.C. Circuits’ holdings, the Ninth 
Circuit found in Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas that federal courts 
have jurisdiction over extradition cases raising challenges to their 
transfer under FARRA.213 The Ninth Circuit held that FARRA 
                                                                                                     
 207. See infra notes 208–09 (providing a summary of Mironescu). 
 208. Mironescu v. Rice, No. 05-683, 2006 WL 167981, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 
20, 2006). 
 209. See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, at 673–77 (4th Cir. 2007)  
This [Section 2242(d)] language plainly conveys that 
although courts may consider or review CAT or FARR Act 
claims as part of their review of a final removal order, they 
are otherwise precluded from considering or reviewing such 
claims. As Mironescu presents his claim as part of his 
challenge to extradition, rather than removal, § 2242(d) 
clearly precluded the district court from exercising 
jurisdiction. 
 210. See supra note 25 (discussing the circuit split).  
 211. See infra Part IV.B (discussing customary international law). 
 212. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (holding that the court does possess jurisdiction to entertain 
Trinidad’s habeas petition: “Neither the REAL ID Act (8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(4)) nor FARRA (8 U.S.C. § 1231 note) repeals all federal habeas 
jurisdiction over Trinidad y Garcia's claims”). 
 213. Id. at 956–57. 
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lacks a clear intent to strip federal courts’ jurisdiction over such 
challenges,214 and the court interpreted the REAL ID Act as 
“confined to addressing final orders of removal, without affecting 
federal habeas jurisdiction [in extradition cases].”215 It thus 
concluded that the “plausible alternative statutory construction” 
preserved federal habeas jurisdiction to hear detainee extradition 
challenges.216  
Four factors confirm the validity of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Garcia. First, courts assume that a statute’s language 
accurately reflects the drafters’ intent.217 Thus, as a general rule 
of statutory interpretation, courts attempt to enforce the literal 
meaning of a statute.218 They realize, however, that this 
assumption might not be accurate because of imperfections in the 
drafting process.219 Linguistic flaws and ambiguities demand that 
courts apply canons of interpretation in order to preserve the 
law’s intent.220 Thus, to preserve the law’s intent, courts “consider 
the history of the subject matter involved, the end to be 
attained . . . and the purpose to be accomplished” in deciding how 
to apply the law.221 Congress passed FARRA to align domestic 
law with U.S. obligations under CAT.222 CAT, and thus FARRA, 
                                                                                                     
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (citing Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“When the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of a statute 
that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no room for 
construction.”); Landon Wade Magnusson, Tying Off Loose Ends: Protecting 
American Citizens From Torture Beyond America’s Borders, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 19, 41 (2012) (discussing the way courts interpret a law’s intentions 
to achieve the spirit of the law). 
 218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing rules of 
statutory interpretation). 
 219. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 217, § 45:2 
(“Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”); Magnusson, supra note 
217, at 41 (discussing the imperfections created by drafters in crafting statutes). 
 220. Magnusson, supra note 217, at 41 (discussing judicial use of canons of 
construction as means to ensure they preserve the intent of a law). 
 221. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 217, § 45:5 
(citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). 
 222. 136 CONG. REC. 36,198 (1990); see supra note 91 (discussing reasons for 
FARRA’s passage). 
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demonstrates a clear intent to eradicate and prevent all forms of 
torture worldwide, including transfers of persons to places posing 
a risk of torture.223 CAT’s Article 3 prohibition of such transfers is 
“general and unlimited: [w]ithout exception, a signatory country 
may not extradite a person likely to face torture.”224 Therefore, 
restricting FARRA claims to final orders of removal creates a 
loophole that would prevent individuals facing extradition from 
challenging their impending transfers, thereby preventing the 
law’s intent to eradicate torture.225  
The second factor that confirms the Ninth Circuit’s Garcia 
holding is its compliance with relevant international law,226 
under which the list of universally accepted customs that rise to 
the level of enforceable law includes several abhorrent practices, 
including genocide, slavery, and torture.227 Customary 
international law goes further as well, recognizing the principle 
of nonrefoulement, which forbids states from transferring 
individuals in its custody to a state practicing torture.228 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Working Group on a Draft 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (Mar. 9, 1984) 
(discussing the intent of CAT and FARRA); J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS 
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) (“The principal aim of the Convention is to 
strengthen the existing prohibition of [torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment] by a number of supportive measures.”); 
Magnusson, supra note 217, at 39, 41 (discussing CAT’s goals as evidenced by 
accompanying documents). 
 224. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 986 (9th Cir. 2012) (Berzon, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 225. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 514–15 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (restricting FARRA claims to challenges to a final order removal 
handed down in immigration cases). 
 226. See GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTURE 3 (2008), http://www. 
cardozo.yu.edu/cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pdf 
(“Under customary international law, the prohibition of torture is jus cogens—a 
peremptory norm that is non-derogable under any circumstances. It is binding 
on all nations. This elevated status within international law places torture on 
par with slavery and genocide.” (citations omitted)); Magnusson, supra note 217, 
at 47–48 (discussing how an interpretation of FARRA that allows for the 
transfer of individuals within U.S. custody to a foreign sovereign practicing 
torture violates international law). 
 227. MILLER, supra note 226, at 3. 
 228. See Magnusson, supra note 217, at 48 n.191 (discussing the origination 
2522 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2487 (2013) 
Additionally, U.S. law emphasizes under the Charming Betsy 
canon that, “[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to 
be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with 
an international agreement of the United States.”229 Therefore, 
FARRA and the REAL ID Act provisions interpreted to restrict 
federal habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases to final orders of 
removal—thereby denying potential extraditee challenges under 
the Acts—run contrary to international law.230  
Third, the D.C. and Fourth Circuits’ conclusion that FARRA 
or the REAL ID Act removes federal habeas jurisdiction in 
extradition challenge cases is unconstitutional.231 The 
Constitution’s framers designed the Suspension Clause to 
incorporate the broadly utilized common law writ of habeas 
corpus as a baseline,232 thus encouraging robust inquiry into 
potential transfers of detainees.233 As such, the Suspension 
Clause must encompass the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue 
writs of habeas corpus in extradition- and FARRA-based transfer 
challenges,234 unless an adequate alternative for hearing such 
                                                                                                     
of nonrefouler in the refugee context before its expansion into international law 
by CAT, and its recent application in England). 
 229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987); see also 
Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (stating that “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains”). 
 230. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1563–64 (discussing the discrepancy 
created by “final order of removal” in both FARRA and the REAL ID Act). 
 231. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 17 n.4 
The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals held [in Garcia] that such 
authority in this case comes from the federal habeas statute, and that 
neither FARRA nor the REAL ID Act of 2005 provided the requisite 
“clear statement” to divest the federal courts of such jurisdiction. 
Although amici agree with this analysis, the Suspension Clause 
discussion . . . undergirds this conclusion by demonstrating why a 
statute taking away such jurisdiction (without providing an adequate 
alternative) would be unconstitutional.  
(citations omitted). 
 232. See id. at 16 (discussing the Suspension Clause’s preservation of the 
common law nature of the writ). 
 233. See id. (discussing how incorporating the Suspension Clause as a 
baseline fosters vigorous inquiry into the conditions surrounding a potential 
transfer); supra Part II.A (discussing the history of habeas corpus and its uses). 
 234. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 16 (discussing the 
Suspension Clause’s preservation of the common law nature of the writ). 
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challenges exists.235 The D.C. and Fourth Circuits’ interpretation 
of FARRA and the REAL ID Act in Omar II and Mironescu failed 
to provide a viable alternative judicial forum for extraditee 
challenges based on torture claims,236 thereby rendering their 
interpretation of those Acts unconstitutional.237 
Finally, it is worth noting that other circuit court judges have 
agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Garcia that FARRA 
does not remove federal courts’ jurisdiction over extraditee 
challenge cases.238 While the D.C. Circuit Court’s Omar II 
majority reasoned that the use of the word “policy” instead of 
“right” in FARRA § 2242(a) evinced Congress’s intent to foreclose 
detainees’ constitutional habeas and procedural due process 
protections,239 D.C. Circuit Court Judge Griffith’s concurrence 
concluded otherwise:240 
When an American citizen is in U.S. custody, the 
Constitution’s guarantee of habeas corpus entitles him to 
assert any claim that his detention or transfer is unlawful. 
Because Congress may not deprive Omar of access to the 
courts without suspending the writ or repealing the statutory 
[FARRA] basis for his claim, neither of which it has done here, 
we must consider his argument . . . .241 
                                                                                                     
 235. Id.; see Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *55 (“Where 
Congress fails to provide an adequate substitute, the Suspension Clause is 
violated.” (quotations omitted) (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–
72 (2008))). 
 236. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1562 (detailing the Fourth Circuit’s 
denial of habeas review for Mironescu without providing him another option to 
air his claims). 
 237. See id. (stating that the failure to provide an adequate alternative to 
habeas review violates the Suspension Clause).  
 238. Infra note 242. 
 239. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 22 n.7 (explaining the 
significance of word choice, according to the D.C. Circuit in Omar II). 
 240. See Omar v. McHugh (Omar II), 646 F.3d 13, 25–29 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Griffith, J., concurring) (“I agree that the [FARRA] statute grants Omar, who is 
being held in Iraq by the U.S. military, no right against being transferred to 
Iraqi authorities, but I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that we have no 
jurisdiction to consider his claim.”). 
 241. Id. 
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Judge Griffith concluded, as several other circuits had,242 that the 
Constitution required the court to hear a potential extraditee’s 
claim that transfer would result in torture.243  
The four factors discussed above provide a clear basis for 
establishing federal courts’ jurisdiction over cases challenging 
extradition orders under CAT or FARRA.244 Despite the D.C. and 
Fourth Circuits’ rulings in Omar II and Mironescu denying 
federal jurisdiction in such cases, the Ninth Circuit’s opposite 
holding on the issue of jurisdiction in Garcia accords most fully 
with FARRA’s statutory intent, well-established international 
legal custom and its canonical application to U.S. law, and the 
historical uses for writs of habeas corpus enshrined in the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause.245 As the following Part will 
argue, however, even the Ninth Circuit’s Garcia ruling erred in 
failing to address substantively the merits of the petitioner’s 
FARRA claim regarding his likelihood of being tortured after his 
removal from the United States.246 
V. The Need for Substantive Review of Detainee Torture Claims 
Under FARRA 
Garcia established a clear basis for federal courts’ 
jurisdiction over extraditees’ habeas petitions, but did not adopt a 
clear stance on how substantive a review must be granted to 
                                                                                                     
 242. See Cadet v. Bulger, 377 F.3d 1173, 1182–83 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding 
jurisdiction); Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 215–18 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(same); Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 200–02 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); 
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); Cornejo Barreto v. 
Seifert (Cornejo Barreto I), 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 n.13 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). But 
see Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 676 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding jurisdiction 
to be stripped); Cornejo Barreto v. Seifert (Cornejo Barreto II), 379 F.3d 1075, 
1086 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated as moot, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(same). 
 243. Omar II, 646 F.3d at 25–29. 
 244. See supra Part IV.B (arguing for the circuit split to be resolved in favor 
of the Garcia conclusion). 
 245. See supra Part IV.A–B (laying out the circuit split and the argument for 
why Garcia comes to the best conclusion). 
 246. See infra Part V (arguing that courts need to review the merits of 
FARRA claims). 
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detainee torture concerns under FARRA.247 Yet the Supreme 
Court’s finding in Boumediene provides a clear indication that 
detainee torture concerns arising under FARRA necessitate a full 
substantive review on the merits of detainee claims.248 An 
analysis of the rule of noninquiry’s intended applications further 
strengthens this case for substantive review.  
A. The Case for Meaningful Review  
As noted above,249 because the writ of habeas corpus is an 
adaptable remedy rather than a right, its application and scope 
depend on the circumstances of a specific case.250 To properly 
consider the circumstances of an extraditee’s case raising claims 
of potential torture, a court must meaningfully review the 
Executive’s ability to lawfully extradite an individual who 
believes he will be tortured.251 Deficiencies of the judicial 
                                                                                                     
 247. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 17–18 (explaining that 
the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result as to jurisdiction in Garcia but 
neglected the substantive challenge a detainee might raise under FARRA). The 
Ninth Circuit held that federal courts do have authority to hear challenges to 
extradition or transfer based on FARRA; however, it limited that jurisdiction to 
a requirement that the Secretary of State file a declaration averring that it is 
not “more likely than not” that the petitioner will face torture upon removal. 
Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(quoting 22 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2013) (emphasis added)). Once the Secretary files 
such a declaration, however, “the court’s inquiry shall have reached its end,” 
and petitioner receives no opportunity to rebut the Secretary’s assurances. Id. 
This holding can be attributed to a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Munaf. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 20  
Notwithstanding Boumediene, the Court of Appeals held that a mere 
declaration by the Secretary (or her designee) that the petitioner will 
not be transferred to torture is the complete judicial review available 
to detainees in this context, based on a misreading of this Court’s 
decision (on the same day as Boumediene) in Munaf. Whereas Munaf 
recognizes the need to accord appropriate deference to the Secretary’s 
determination, nothing in Munaf suggests that such deference should 
be absolute—as the Court of Appeals concluded. 
 248. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (detailing the 
necessary review with reference to INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).  
 249. Supra Part II.  
 250. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (reviewing the nature of habeas). 
 251. See id. at 783 (“The habeas court must have sufficient authority to 
conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s 
power to detain.”). 
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proceeding certifying extraditability and the limited deference 
accorded to the Executive Branch in such cases require that 
courts conduct more expansive review.252 
“[T]he common-law habeas court’s role was most extensive in 
cases . . . where there had been little or no previous judicial 
review.”253 By analogizing habeas to procedural due process, the 
Court determined that “the necessary scope of habeas review in 
part depend[ed] on the rigor of any earlier proceedings.”254 In 
Boumediene, the only review of petitioner’s indefinite military 
detention came from the CSRTs.255 The Supreme Court, affirming 
the D.C. Circuit, considered the CSRTs’ review insufficient to 
satisfy the “meaningful opportunity” for review required under 
the Suspension Clause:  
For the writ of habeas corpus, or its substitute, to function as 
an effective and proper remedy in this context, the court that 
conducts the habeas proceeding must have the means to 
correct errors that occurred during the [underlying] 
proceedings. This includes some authority to assess the 
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence against the detainee. 
It also must have the authority to admit and consider relevant 
exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the 
earlier proceeding.256 
Similarly, in Garcia, the State Department “denied Trinidad an 
opportunity to review and rebut any evidence against him;”257 his 
administrative proceedings, therefore, were similarly insufficient 
to those provided by the CSRTs in Boumediene.258 Such closed 
                                                                                                     
 252. See id. at 780 (discussing the need for judicial review based on the 
sufficiency of the underlying judicial proceedings); Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba 
II), 561 F.3d 509, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment 
and dissenting in part) (arguing that deference to the Executive Branch need 
not be absolute). 
 253. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780. 
 254. Id. at 781. 
 255. Id. at 779–92. 
 256. Id. at 786 (citations omitted); cf. Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. 
(Khouzam II), 549 F.3d 235, 259 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that in removal 
proceedings, it violates due process to deny a noncitizen the opportunity to rebut 
diplomatic assurances made by a foreign sovereign that the detainee will not be 
tortured once removed).  
 257. Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *24. 
 258. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (finding that Trinidad’s administrative review was insufficient). 
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proceedings require a “more searching review”259 because of the 
high risk of harm that may occur as a result of an erroneous 
determination.260 Given the Supreme Court’s holding that the 
CSRTs did not provide petitioners an adequate forum for review 
under the Suspension Clause,261 Garcia’s judicial forum should 
fail any similar standard of adequacy.262 Therefore, sufficient 
judicial review requires assessment of the government’s evidence 
and presentation by the petitioner regarding his torture claim 
before ending the extradition inquiry.263 
Additionally, while the Supreme Court in Munaf emphasized 
the importance of according appropriate deference to the 
Secretary’s determination of the likelihood of the petitioner’s 
torture, nothing suggests that such deference must be absolute or 
that it cannot be overcome—particularly in the context of 
extradition.264 As D.C. Circuit Court Judge Griffith stated, “I do 
not believe Munaf compels absolute deference to the 
government . . . and I believe the premise of Boumediene requires 
that the detainees have . . . some opportunity to challenge the 
government assurances.”265 Thus, to ensure the accuracy of the 
government’s representations, individuals must be able to 
challenge the veracity of the assurances for a “naked declaration 
                                                                                                     
 259. Id. at 997. 
 260. See id. (explaining why closed proceedings require more intense 
inquiry).  
 261. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008) (“[T]he procedural 
protections afforded to the detainees in the CSRT hearings are far more limited, 
and, we conclude, fall well short of the procedures and adversarial mechanisms 
that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.”). 
 262. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 997–98 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing the Secretary’s decision on the likelihood of torture 
is insufficient based on the Boumediene analysis of CSRTs’ deficiencies). 
 263. See id. (detailing the contours of sufficient judicial review). 
 264. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the contours 
of deference); Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 20; Garcia, 683 F.3d at 
967 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (believing that the judiciary should not play a role 
in the review of Trinidad’s claims, but noting that Congress will either prefer 
courts play a “minimal role” and accord “minimal” review, or play a “greater 
role,” but not suggesting courts have no role in reviewing the extradition 
process). 
 265. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
2528 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2487 (2013) 
simply cannot resolve the issue.”266 Therefore, if deference need 
not be absolute, courts must have the authority in cases in which 
a detainee brings a FARRA claim to review negotiated assurances 
that torture will not occur.267 
The preceding cases establish that an extraditee should have 
a right to substantive review of his claim under CAT or FARRA 
challenging his transfer, and to present evidence to rebut the 
requesting country’s assurances to the U.S. government that he 
will not be tortured upon return.268 Before proceeding to a 
substantive review of the merits of an extraditee’s claim, 
however, the court must consider whether the rule of noninquiry 
allows it to consider the merits of such a claim. 
B. Supplemental Considerations in Support of Substantive 
Review: Separation of Powers and the Rule of Noninquiry 
Judicial power is limited.269 For example, courts may not 
evaluate the conduct of foreign governments according to the U.S. 
Constitution.270 Despite the limits of judicial inquiry, “it is 
                                                                                                     
 266. Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). See also id. at 545 (“[I]t is the [habeas] court’s responsibility to make 
the materiality determination itself.”). 
 267. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 22–23 (arguing that “it 
seems clear that the [Munaf] Court meant to leave open at least some possibility 
for a detainee to rebut the Secretary’s assurances”). 
 268. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767 (2008) (arguing for 
meaningful review of detainee challenges to detention or transfer); Garcia, 683 
F.3d at 985–98 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing 
for limited review of the Secretary’s decision regarding torture in the context of 
an extraditee’s FARRA claim). 
 269. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 744. 
 270. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (providing an example of the judiciary’s limited power); Munaf v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 677 (2008) (stating that a foreign sovereign has the right to 
prosecute American citizens for the crimes committed on its soil, and those 
Americans cannot complain that the foreign sovereign’s legal system does not 
include all of the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution); Neely v. Henkel, 
180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901)  
[W]hen an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he 
cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to 
such punishment as the laws of the country may prescribe for its own 
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indubitably the role of courts to ensure that American officials 
obey the law.”271 Garcia cited the rule of noninquiry as a potential 
limitation on courts’ right to review the Secretary of State’s 
determination regarding the likelihood that a detainee would face 
torture upon his transfer to a foreign country.272 Fundamentally, 
the rule of noninquiry can be understood as a prudential 
constraint under the Separation of Powers Doctrine on judges’ 
ability to overrule the Executive Branch’s extradition 
authority.273 Yet confusion exists among the courts as to when the 
rule applies.274 In 1993, the First Circuit in In re Extradition of 
Howard275 articulated the view on the rule’s applicability 
garnering the most widespread acceptance: 
The rule did not spring from a belief that courts, as an 
institution, lack either the [constitutional] authority or the 
capacity to evaluate foreign legal systems. Rather, the rule 
came into being as judges, attempting to interpret particular 
treaties, concluded that, absent a contrary indication in a 
specific instance, the ratification of an extradition treaty 
mandated non-inquiry as a matter of international comity.276 
Because the rule of noninquiry is a judge-made rule, statutes 
such as FARRA creating express substantive rights enforceable 
through habeas relief preempt the rule’s application.277 As a 
                                                                                                     
people, unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations 
between that country and the United States. 
 271. Garcia, 683 F.3d at 995 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 272. Id. at 957 (majority opinion) (citing Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 
1322, 1326–27 (9th Cir. 1997)); see Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 
24 (citing the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion on the role of separation of powers and 
the rule of noninquiry in Garcia). 
 273. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 24 (detailing the rule of 
noninquiry). 
 274. See id. at 23–24 (explaining the various understandings of the rule of 
noninquiry).  
 275. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 276. Id. at 1330 n.6 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Legal Historians, 
supra note 59, at 24 (arguing that the First Circuit’s articulation formulation is 
the correct interpretation of the rule of noninquiry); Parry, supra note 39, at 
1978–96 (examining the evolution of the noninquiry doctrine). 
 277. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 24 (discussing the rule 
of noninquiry). 
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result, courts are justified in undertaking a factual inquiry based 
on a FARRA claim regarding the circumstances of the transfer.278 
Thus, under the rule of noninquiry, nothing prohibits judicial 
scrutiny into the substance of the Secretary of State’s 
determination that a transferee does not face a substantial risk of 
torture.279  
Furthermore, an analogous rule governing common law 
habeas jurisprudence at the time of the Constitution’s ratification 
also supports such an interpretation. Eighteenth century English 
judges routinely discarded a black-letter rule forbidding them 
from examining facts that contested an individual’s transfer280 in 
cases in which there had been little previous judicial review 
regarding the causes for his detention.281 When no other 
opportunity for judicial review existed and a prisoner applied for 
habeas relief, courts engaged in factual inquiries into the 
detention, regardless of any rule barring inquiry.282 Under 
FARRA and the REAL ID Act, which confine judicial review to 
final orders of removal, extradition cases like Garcia in which no 
other opportunity for review exists fit squarely into such a 
framework, further justifying the need for a substantive inquiry 
into the circumstances of an individual’s impending transfer.283  
Having established a clear legal justification for substantive 
judicial review of detainee claims under CAT and FARRA, courts 
must carefully develop a framework for such reviews, balancing 
                                                                                                     
 278. See id. (arguing for the legitimacy of judicial review in the FARRA 
context); Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 985–98 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for limited 
review of these decisions). 
 279. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 23–24 (analyzing the 
effects of the rule of noninquiry on the Secretary’s review of the likelihood of 
torture).  
 280. See id. at 23 n.7 (comparing the rule of noninquiry to the old English 
rule). 
 281. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 780 (2008) (explaining that 
judges did not consistently follow the black-letter rule as it was subject to 
exceptions in habeas cases). 
 282. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 23 n.7 (detailing the 
history of prisoner habeas review (citing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42, at 
2102)). 
 283. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 23 (arguing for the 
necessity of substantive judicial review into a potential transfer in extradition 
cases). 
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legitimate concerns of the executive branch with the need for 
judicial scrutiny.284 It is toward this goal that this Note turns 
next. 
VI. Proposing a Rule of Limited Inquiry to Provide Meaningful 
Judicial Review  
Two procedural questions confront any potential rule for 
judicial review of detainee transfer challenges arising under 
FARRA.285 First, when the Executive Branch examines a 
challenge to detention or removal, what procedural protections 
must it provide? Second, when a reviewing court, exercising 
habeas jurisdiction, reviews Executive Branch determinations 
that a transferee does not face a substantial likelihood of torture, 
what is the appropriate scope of judicial review?286 These 
questions indicate that such a rule must strike a balance between 
providing meaningful review to transferees’ petitions, staying 
true to the intention of habeas corpus protections, and following 
the law on one hand while respecting the purview of the executive 
branch on the other.287 As a result, a rule of limited inquiry, in 
which the courts examine the government’s findings and 
negotiated assurances and examine the petitioner’s evidence, best 
protects these competing interests and requirements while 
providing detainees the meaningful review they are 
constitutionally guaranteed. 
A. What Habeas Demands 
In circumstances in which a detainee can present 
“reasonably available evidence demonstrating there is no basis 
for his continued detention,” habeas demands he have the 
                                                                                                     
 284. See infra Part VI.A (examining habeas’s demands for judicial review). 
 285. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 42, at 2089 (discussing the procedural 
rights of individuals challenging their detention or removal). 
 286. See id. (inquiring about the due scope of review).  
 287. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (explaining the competing interests that must be balanced in developing 
a rule of inquiry). 
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opportunity to make such a presentation to a habeas court.288 
When an individual faces the possibility of being transferred to a 
country in which he may face a substantial risk of torture, the 
“rudimentaries of an adversary proceeding” demand that he be 
afforded an opportunity to challenge the government’s 
representations that torture is not likely to occur.289 While this 
explains the availability of adversarial review of the status of 
Guantanamo detainees, it neglects the same process for the 
lawfulness of extraditions.290 To safeguard the habeas protections 
affirmed by and extended to detainees by the Supreme Court in 
Boumediene, extraditees must be able to challenge the 
government’s assurances that transfer will not result in torture. 
In all of these instances, because habeas exists as an “adaptable 
remedy” in which the “precise application and scope [changes] 
depending on the circumstances,”291 the writ demands that courts 
undertake a full substantive review of an individual’s claim that 
he will be tortured if transferred to a foreign country.292 
B. Assuaging Government Concerns Regarding Enhanced 
Judicial Review 
The State Department expresses concerns regarding judicial 
review of its torture determinations in extradition cases.293 The 
                                                                                                     
 288. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 790 (2008). 
 289. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 290. See id. at 525 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part) (comparing review for Guantanamo Bay detainees and potential 
extraditees). 
 291. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. 
 292. See Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 5–6  
FARRA . . . creates a substantive right against the involuntary return 
of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
Thus, the Suspension Clause requires that courts afford detainees an 
opportunity to show that it is “more likely than not” that they will be 
tortured once transferred, even when the Secretary avers to the 
contrary. 
(quotations omitted). 
 293. See generally Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (discussing government concerns to judicial review in this context); 
see also Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
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government emphasizes the “sensitive and delicate” nature of 
obtaining assurances from a foreign government, which may 
involve conditions on extraction or setting up a monitoring 
process to track the extraditee’s treatment upon return.294 
Because of the nature of this process, the government alleges that 
judicial review in this area may harm foreign relations, 
jeopardize foreign relations, or both.295  
In response, employing a “scaled approach”—evaluating the 
State Department’s declaration that an extradition can occur 
consistent with CAT based on the record regarding the likelihood 
of torture upon extradition296—emphasizes the importance of 
judicial deference to the Secretary’s substantive determination.297 
While extradition cases involve information regarding diplomatic 
relations with other countries, they do not seem to implicate—as 
cases like Boumediene and Munaf did—national security.298 
                                                                                                     
the State Department’s views on the political question doctrine are considered 
in deciding to exercise review). 
 294. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 999 (discussing the process of obtaining 
government assurances); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 671–72 (4th Cir. 
2007) (explaining that how the executive branch is well-suited to making 
extradition decisions); United States v. Kin Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 
1997) (“The State Department alone, and not the judiciary, has the power to 
attach conditions to an order of extradition.”); Emami v. Dist. Court, 834 F.2d 
1444, 1454 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The need for flexibility in the exercise of Executive 
discretion is heightened in international extradition proceedings which 
necessarily implicate the foreign policy interests of the United States.” (quoting 
Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir. 1980) (citation 
omitted))); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that 
“the degree of risk to [the petitioning detainee’s] life from extradition is an issue 
that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive branch”). 
 295. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 999–1001 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (discussing the government’s four main concerns about 
involving the judiciary in review of executive determinations on the likelihood of 
torture). 
 296. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (“The Solicitor General 
explains that such [likelihood-of-torture] determinations are based on ‘the 
Executive’s assessment of the foreign country’s legal system and . . . the 
Executive[’s] . . . ability to obtain foreign assurances it considers reliable.’” 
(citation omitted)). In many ways, this comports with the caveat left by Chief 
Justice Roberts in Munaf, stating that a more extreme case—one in which 
evidence of torture is identified by the State Department but the Secretary 
decides to extradite anyway—may arise and warrant further judicial review. Id.  
 297. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 998 (explaining how a scaled approach 
encompasses deference to executive branch assurances). 
 298. See id. at 999 (discussing the differences between normal extradition 
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Because of the courts’ familiarity in dealing with sensitive 
information, they have developed effective procedures, such as in 
camera review and protective orders, for reviewing such 
information in a guarded manner.299 Through these means, courts 
ameliorate the danger of revealing confidential or classified 
information,300 and may in fact bolster U.S. foreign relations by 
ensuring the United States honor its international obligations 
under CAT.301 
Further, judges often face the task of assessing the likelihood 
of torture in removal proceedings in immigration courts.302 While 
courts lack the “ability to communicate with the foreign 
government or to weigh the situation there, including the 
bilateral relationship with the United States, with resources and 
                                                                                                     
cases and Guantanamo detainee cases and their relative effects on national 
security). 
 299. See id. (explaining judicial mechanisms for dealing with classified and 
sensitive foreign policy information); Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 673 
(4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the court has “no reason to doubt that district 
courts can adequately protect the confidentiality of such [sensitive] 
communications [between the executive branch and foreign governments] by 
considering them in camera, as the district court intends to do here”); Quinn v. 
Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 788 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the availability of in 
camera disclosure for judicial consideration of sensitive State Department 
information); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 514–15 (7th Cir. 1981) (explaining 
that the State Department can and has made it a practice to share information 
with the courts during extradition proceedings, often through an in camera 
review process); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008) (“We 
recognize, however, that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting 
sources and methods of intelligence gathering; and we expect that the District 
Court will use its discretion to accommodate this interest to the greatest extent 
possible.”); Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 
2025 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. App. 3) (describing procedures for the use of 
classified information in criminal proceedings); FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 (describing 
procedures for protective orders and filing documents under seal); Robert 
Timothy Reagan, The New ‘‘Public Court’’: Classified Information in Federal 
Court, 53 VILL. L. REV. 889, 904–05 (2008) (exploring procedures for the use of 
classified information in post-9/11 federal civil and criminal proceedings).  
 300. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (discussing the effects of protective measures). 
 301. See Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *28 (explaining the 
benefits of judicial review in transfer and torture determinations). 
 302. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 1000 (“In the immigration context, courts 
frequently review claims that an individual, if removed, is likely to be tortured 
and therefore is entitled to withholding or deferral of removal under CAT and 
the FARR Act.”); Garcia Brief of Appellee, supra note 93, at *28 (explaining 
judicial review of torture claims in immigration courts). 
TORTUROUS TRANSFERS 2535 
expertise comparable to those of the State Department,”303 
adjudicating claims of torture and entitlement to relief under 
CAT and FARRA in immigration cases often involves assessing 
diplomatic assurances of the kind found in extradition 
proceedings.304 If judicial competence allows evaluations of 
foreign assurances in the immigration context, courts must be 
capable of doing the same in the extradition context.305 
Finally, the government expresses further concern with 
timeliness and the ability of judges to make determinations 
regarding the probability of an individual facing torture.306 
Promptness in extradition proceedings helps ensure that other 
nations will remain prompt in responding to U.S. requests and 
prevents statute of limitations problems.307 In addressing this 
valid concern, courts regularly implement expedited procedures 
and proceedings when necessary and appropriate.308 Weighing 
                                                                                                     
 303. Reply Brief for Appellant at 43, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 
952 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (No. 09-56999) [hereinafter Garcia Brief for 
Appellant]. 
 304. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 1000 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (explaining what courts must evaluate in reviewing potential 
extraditions); Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S. (Khouzam II), 549 F.3d 235, 
259 (3d Cir. 2008) 
Prior to removal on the basis of diplomatic assurances, Khouzam 
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to test the reliability of 
those assurances in a hearing  . . . . The alien must have an 
opportunity to present, before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker, 
evidence and arguments challenging the reliability of diplomatic 
assurances proffered by the Government, and the Government’s 
compliance with the relevant regulations. 
Further, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European states all allow 
judicial review of diplomatic assurances. Parry, supra note 39, at 2022. 
 305. See Garcia, 683 F.3d at 1000 (arguing for the competence of judges to 
review diplomatic assurances in other contexts, and not just the immigration 
context). 
 306. Id.; see Garcia Brief for Appellant, supra note 303, at 30, 43 (“A timely 
extradition process is a necessary aspect of a functioning extradition 
relationship. Excessive delay can jeopardize a foreign prosecution and undercut 
the core objective of extradition relationships in ensuring that fugitives are 
brought to justice in the country in which their criminal conduct occurred.”). 
 307. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(per curiam) (discussing the benefits of promptness in judicial review).  
 308. See id. (explaining the various procedures courts take to ensure 
expediency). Trinidad, in his reply brief, felt that blame for the delay in his case 
rested with the government and felt a court decision could expedite the 
proceedings: 
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the government’s rightful interest in timeliness against a 
petitioner’s right to habeas relief if his extradition would be 
unlawful, courts have determined that a petitioner’s liberty 
interests must outweigh the government’s delay concerns, which 
can be ameliorated through expedition.309  
C. A Framework for Review 
Because FARRA does not foreclose substantive judicial 
review in extradition cases, appropriate procedures for 
meaningful review for individuals facing extradition orders can 
be established. After analyzing many cases involving FARRA 
claims, using a “rule of limited inquiry” allows extraditees to 
challenge their transfer under FARRA while guaranteeing that 
the Secretary adheres to U.S. obligations under CAT and 
FARRA.310 
Under a rule of limited inquiry, the transferee bears the 
burden of demonstrating through “strong, credible, and specific 
evidence” that, despite the Secretary’s contrary determination, 
his torture upon extradition is more likely than not.311 To 
                                                                                                     
But the Government, not Trinidad, is responsible for protracting the 
litigation. At every stage, Trinidad sought judicial review of his FARR 
Act claim but the district court deferred review of his claim until his 
second habeas petition. . . .[T]he Government vigorously challenged 
Trinidad’s right to seek habeas review requiring multiple rounds of 
briefing. The Government even disregarded a court order to produce 
the administrative record, further delaying the process. In any event, 
the en banc Court’s resolution of this issue here will expedite the 
habeas process for all future cases. 
Appellee’s Supplemental en banc Brief at 64–65, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 
683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (No. 09-56999). 
 309. See Garcia 683 F.3d at 1000 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (expressing the importance of a petitioner’s liberty interests 
over the government’s concerns regarding timeliness); Mironescu v. Costner, 
480 F.3d 664, 673 (4th Cir. 2007) (arguing that although “habeas review may 
delay extradition, or preclude it altogether, [it] cannot negate [the detainee’s] 
right to obtain habeas relief if he is being detained in violation of federal law”). 
 310. See Garcia 683 F.3d at 1000 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (explaining how the rule of limited inquiry strikes a balance 
between competing demands).  
 311. Id. at 1001; see also Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 59, at 23 
(stating that “the deference to which the Secretary is entitled means simply that 
the burden on the merits is properly placed on the detainee in such 
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establish a prima facie case under his FARRA claim, he must 
show that no reasonable factfinder could find otherwise.312 If and 
only if he meets both prongs, the burden shifts to the Secretary to 
produce evidence, if she so chooses, to establish the basis for her 
determination that torture is, in fact, not more likely than not.313 
The reviewing court will “inquire only into credible claims of 
physical mistreatment or . . . punishment,”314 examining the 
evidence presented by both sides in determining whether 
extradition would lawfully abide by the prohibitions set out under 
FARRA.315 This pre-extradition procedure316 ensures that the 
government adheres to its CAT and FARRA obligations and 
protects the rights of people facing extradition,317 and that the 
court accords appropriate deference to the executive once 
extradition is final and review is foreclosed.318  
Cabining review ensures that examining courts will not need 
to conduct a full, searching evaluation of negotiated assurances 
and the Secretary’s decisions in extradition cases.319 In this way, 
                                                                                                     
circumstances—as it should be”). 
 312. Garcia, 683 F.3d at 1001. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Parry, supra note 39, at 2023. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 261–62 (1987) 
(explaining that “the [Supreme] Court has upheld procedures affording less than 
a full evidentiary hearing if some kind of a hearing ensuring an effective initial 
check against mistaken decisions is provided before the deprivation occurs, and 
a prompt opportunity for complete administrative and judicial review is 
available” (quotations omitted)). Such procedures are common and have been 
held to be necessary by the Supreme Court in other circumstances. Id. 
 317. See Parry, supra note 39, at 2022 (explaining how this procedure would 
honor CAT and FARRA obligations). 
 318. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 95.1–95.4 (2013) (laying out the process for hearing 
challenges to extradition, and ending review once the Secretary signs a final 
order of extradition). 
 319. See Parry, supra note 39, at 2022 (explaining the benefits of a rule of 
limited inquiry). The government argues that judicial competence in 
immigration cases does not indicate such competence in the extradition process 
because extradition treaties bear on human rights norms and commitments, 
meaning torture is less likely in extradition. See Garcia Brief of Appellant, 
supra note 303, at 19–20 (detailing the government’s arguments). While that 
may raise the bar for the showing a detainee must make to combat the 
Secretary’s certification of CAT and FARRA compliance, it should not obviate all 
judicial review of substantive FARRA enforcement in habeas. Trinidad y Garcia 
v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
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courts can play a vital—but restrained—role in ensuring that the 
government fulfills habeas’s demands while respecting the 
expertise of the executive.320 
VII. Conclusion 
With the development of the circuit split on the issue of 
jurisdiction after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garcia,321 the 
“thorny constitutional thicket” worsened,322 as predicted by 
scholars.323 But this debate is not without an answer.324 Garcia’s 
holding—establishing federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to hear 
FARRA claims by potential extraditees challenging their 
transfer325—conforms with FARRA’s statutory intent, well-
established international legal custom and its applicability to 
U.S. law, and the historic uses for writs of habeas corpus 
enshrined in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.326 
Additionally, courts have a further role in this process.327 Based 
on the flexible remedy of habeas corpus, Boumediene’s promise of 
meaningful review, and the Suspension Clause’s guarantee of a 
sufficient forum, extraditee torture concerns arising under 
FARRA necessitate a substantive review on the merits of habeas 
claims.328 This requirement is met by a rule of limited inquiry, 
                                                                                                     
 320. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (“Habeas corpus 
proceedings need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by 
executive order. But the writ must be effective. The habeas court must have 
sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for 
detention and the Executive’s power to detain.”). 
 321. See supra note 25 (discussing the circuit split); supra Part IV (same). 
 322. Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1572. 
 323. Id.  
 324. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the case for federal courts’ habeas 
jurisdiction over FARRA claims). 
 325. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam). 
 326. See supra Part IV.A–B (laying out the circuit split and arguing for 
Garcia as the best conclusion). 
 327. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771  (2008) (discussing the role 
of courts in judicial review of the merits of petitioners’ claims); Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2009) (same); Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of the 
U.S. (Khouzam II), 549 F.3d 235, 250 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). 
 328. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).  
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which ensures that the government abides by habeas’s demands, 
the court provides the appropriate deference to the Executive 
Branch, and both respect the rights of extraditees.329  
“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions 
for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations . . . , it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual 
liberties are at stake.”330 While foreign affairs remains, in large 
part, within the Executive Branch’s purview, this competence 
does not foreclose a role (if even minimal) for the other 
branches—particularly the Judiciary.331  
  
                                                                                                     
 329. See supra Part VI (discussing a rule of limited inquiry). 
 330. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. See also Khouzam II, 549 F.3d at 250 
(“Although the Executive and Legislative Branches bear primary responsibility 
for the conduct of foreign affairs, it is error to suppose that every case or 
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” 
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (quotations omitted))); United 
States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 1979) (“We are less inclined to 
withhold review when individual liberty . . . is implicated.”). 
 331. See supra Part V.A (discussing the role of the courts in the foreign 
policy arena). 
